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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAJ.'WA SANDBERG; WANDA SANDBERG,
Administratrix of the ESTATE OF
WAYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG,
by WA..~DA SANDBERG, her Guardian,

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN,
JANE DOE and all other persons
unknown claiming any right, title
or interest in the real property
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs'
title thereto,
Defendants and
Respondents,
AND
In the Matter of the ESTATE
OF
WAYNE SANDBERG,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15146
Case No. 15274

REPLY BRIEF
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL TO DATE
In light of Respondents' statement that a procedural
irregularity exists in this appeal, Appellants will bring
the Court current on and clarify the relevant procedural
history of this case, both in the lower court and on appeal.
(Respondents' Brief, hereinafter RB, at 4)
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Appellants filed this action in the Fifth Judicial
District seeking to quiet title to lands which Respondent
Klein claimed he had purchased pursuant to an a) lPged exerche
of an Option Agreement.
specific performance.

(R. 1)

Klein counterclaimed for

(R. 166)

Both parties filed summary judgment motions under
Rule 56 U.R.C.P.

The motions were heard on March 15, 1977,

Judge Don V. Tibbs temporarily presiding.
On March 24, 1977, Judge Tibbs signed an Order,
docketed on March 25, which contained Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Lav a.id ultimately decreed specific performance in favor of the Respondents in conformance with a Real
Estate Purchase Contract submitted by Respondents.

(R. 358,

324)

The Order further instructed Respondents, the prevailing

~

to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in

conformity with Respondents' Affidavit which the lower court
specifically found constituted "a true and correct statement
of the facts". (R. 359)
On Thursday, April 7, 1977, Respondents mailed a
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law grossly
inconsonant to those "facts" found by the court in March.
Sua sponte, Respondents submitted a second Order and Judgment
and Decree of Specific Performance.

Appellants' counsel and

the lower court received these documents on Monday, April 11,

19"/7.

That same day Appellants' counsel learned that the

additional Findings and Conclusions and second Judgment had
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been irrunediately signed by the court. (Transcript May 25,
1977, 6:14-16; 8:19-21; R. 368; R. 369-391)
On April 15, 1977, Appellants appealed the original
Order of Specific Performance docketed on March 25, 1977.l/
(R. 363)

Simultaneously and consistent with Rule 52(b)

U.R.C.P., Appellants filed an objection to the Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law proposed by Respondent. (R. 361;
see also attachment to Clerk's Certificate filed June 16,
1977 in Case No. 15146)
Though the Notice of Appeal filed April 15, 1977
indicated the appeal was solely from the Order of Specific
Performance signed on Harch 24, Respondents convinced the
lower court that the filing of the notice had divested it of
jurisdiction to hear Appellants' objections to the second
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and second
Order and Decree.

(R. 363; Transcript May 25, 1977 3:17-22;

Minute Entry attached to Clerk's Certificate filed June 16,
1977 in No. 15146)~/

Despite the lower court's holding that

it had no jurisdiction after April 15, 1977, Respondents'
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
second Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance
were docketed on April 19, 1977. (R. 369, 386)
The irregular presence of the two conclusive
Orders and two separate sets of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, resulted in Appellants' perfection of two
independent appeals.

-3-
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In late July, Appellants obtained special permission,
pursuant to Rule 7S(p)(:l) U.R.C.P., and fjled an enlarged
brief in the appeal from the original Order.

Re~~ondents

have described that brief as a conglomeration of legal
"technicalities, niceties, arguments and sophistry". (RB SO)
In August Respondents moved to dismiss both appeals.
On September 6, 1977, this Court denied those motions,
instead consolidating, sua sponte, Case Numbers 15146 and
15274 for appeal.
As the consolidation occurred more than one month
after Appellants filed their brief, a section in this Reply
<)

Brief will briefly correlate the arguments of that earlier
brief with the second set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific
Performance.l/

See Table I, Appendix.
RELIEF SOUGHT AND GROUNDS THEREOF

Appellants contend that at the very least that
Court must vacate the summary judgment and remand this case
for trial, inasmuch as there are unresolved fact issues
material to the legal issues on which the lower court based
its judgment.

Among these are:

1. Did Mrs. Sandberg "excuse" the timely, proper
exercise of the option?
2. Here Mr. Klein's acts sufficient to find part
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of
Fr aucls?
.
3.

Did Mr. Kl2in tender proper consideration?

4. Does Mr. Klein have clean hands requisite to
seeking equitable relief?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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5. Can an unaided surveyor locate one definite
parcel of land using the land descriptions in the
various documents before the Court?
6. Where are the physical reference points
referred to in the various documents?
7. Did Mr. Klein exercise as to all or part of
the property?
Clearly, these issues, decided in favor of Respondents by the lower court were both factually contested and
material. As such, they should be resolved by a trier of
fact.

Hellstrom v. D. A. Osguthorpe, 22 Utah 2d 440, 455

P.2d 28 (1969).

In Transamerica Title Insurance Company v.

United Resources, Inc. 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970),
this Court said:
It is thus clear from the rule that when upon the basis
of the pleadings, depositions, answers ~< * ~<, admissions
and affidavits, which we herein refer to as 'submissions,' a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
But if it appears from such submissions that there is
a dispute as to any issue of fact which would be
determinative of the rights of the parties, it should
be denied and tri·al should be had to resolve the
disputed issues. 24 Utah 2d at 348 (emphasis added)
This Court in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), amplified
the Transamerica language as follows:
A sunnnary judgment must be supported by evidence,
admissions and inferences which when viewed in the
light most favorable to the loser, shows that there is
no ~enuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.' Such showing must preclude all reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a
judgment in his favor.
(11 Utah 2d at 4-5) (emphasis
added)

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, to sustain the lower court's judgment, this
Court must not only make findings consistent with those made
in the luwer court

bu~

further find that as to these facts

there was no issue, completely prejudging Appellants' version
of the facts as having no credibility or weight, without the
benefit of a trial.

Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah

2d 415, 464 P.2d 580 (1970); Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah
2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967).
Beyond the existence of material fact issues,
Appellants contend that several legal issues are decisive
and allow this Cpurt to avoid remand and simply reverse and
enter judgmen·_-; in Appellants' favor.

Among these are:

1. That Respondents have failed to exercise the
option, which required timely submission of a real
estate contract.
2. That the option required future agreement of
the parties and was not complete and thus incapable of
specific performance.
3. That the consideration tendered and to be paid
under the contract is not in conformity with the option.
4. That the documentary evidence pled in Respondents' counterclaim is insufficient to support a contract
under the Statute of Frauds.
Appellants firmly believe that these legal issues,
as to which there are no disputed facts, compel a reversal
and entry of judgment on behalf of Appellants.

If that is

not done, this Court, viewing the submissions in a light

-

most favorable to the Appellants, 111ust find that there are
unresolved issues of material fact which should be determined by a trial.

-6-
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POINT I
THE SCOPE OF REVIEW ENCOMPASSES BOTH LAW AND FACT
Respondents apparently agree (1) that the Supreme
Court in an equitable proceeding is charged with reviewing
both factual and legal issues; (2) that Summary Judgments do
not enjoy the normal presumptions attributable to findings
and judgments made after trial; and (3) that all inferences
are to be drawn in favor of the losing party below.

(RB 13)

Nonetheless, Respondents suggest that this Court should now
make an exception and "concern itself only with the legal
issues, notwithstanding its power to review the facts in
equity cases," due primarily to Appellants' failure to treat
the second findings in their original brief. (RB 15)
Respondents further interpret the language in an exchange
between Judge Tibbs and Appellants' counsel, Mr. Thompson,
as a stipulation and waiver of trial. (Id.)

Appellants deny

that this was thei.r intent, and further contend that Respondents' assertions are without both factual foundation and
judicial precedent.
Respondents' suggestion that this Court not review
the facts is bottomed in the lower court's express finding
that the prevailing parties' self-serving affidavit, not the
losers' assertions, constituted "a true and correct statement of the facts." (R. 359)

To suggest, therefore, that

this Court not exercise its "power" to review the facts is
to ask that this Court to shirk a self-imposed duty.
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).

That
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suggestion, contrary to long-accepted standards of appellate
review,'±/ should serve as a forewarning Lhat the "facts"
cannot be sustained by a careful scrutiny of the pleadings,
submissions, and contentions of the parties.
POINT II
THE SECOND SET OF FINDINGS OF FACT /u~D
CONCLUSIONS OF LAH IS INVALID, IMPROPER,
AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVLDENCE
A.

The Second Findings and Conclusions are Entitled
to Little, if Any, Weight.
Respondents' brief notes that Appellants have not

specifically attacked any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions
of Law entered April 19, 1977, claiming that, as a result,
they are unchallenged.

For several reasons, Appellants did

not treat the April 19 findings and conclusions in their
original brief.
First, the Order initially appealed from contained
its own findings and conclusions, and completely resolved
the issues. Judicially drafted, Appellants felt that its
three pages were entitled to more weight than the seventeen
page self-serving document proferred by Respondents.

Further,

whereas the judge simply found the Option Agreement clear,
unambigous, and properly exercised, Respondents' findings
also find waiver of defective exercise, estoppel against the
assertion of those defects, if any, and part performance,
all of which are both unnecessary and contradictory to the
prior findings.

Obviously, Respondent has made his own

findings and drawn his own conclusions, rather than merely
drafting them in accordance with '.~he judicially pronounced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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viewpoint.~/

The practice has been condemned, and in the

instant case ubiquitously granted the Respondents the plenary
powers to protect their record.

As noted in Kentucky Milk

Mktg. v. Borden, 456 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1969):
We do not condemn this practice in instances where the
court is utilizing the services of the attorney only in
order to complete the physical task of drafting the
record. However, to the extent that the court delegates its power to make findings of fact and draw
conclusions this is not good practice . . . . Especially
after the court has indicated by its orders a final
disposition of the case.
To permit counsel to clutter up the record by filing
detailed, lengthy, contradictory findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which, as in this case, are designed
for no purpose other than to attempt to cover up mistakes that might have been made in the trial can serve
no useful purpose but to unduly enlarge, confuse,
compound, and expand appellate records. Id. at 834.
Appellants felt that this Court would rely on the court's
findings rather than those drafted by Respondents.
Second, the findings are obviously improper under
the procedural standards for Summary Judgment.

On Rule 56

motions the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable
to the opposing party, and inferences drawn in his favor.
Below, the affidavit of Respondent Klein in support of
his own motion was adopted as findings to support a surmnary
judgment in his favor, even though the only affidavit
stipulated to as fact for both motions was one filed by the

Appellants.~/

The findings are thus suspect at the outset.

Singleton v. Alexander, supra.
Third, Appellants were aware that "[f]indings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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:i

motions under Rule 12 or 56

"

Rule 52 U.R.C.P.

The

reason that no findings are needed is simple:
Since . . . a surrnnary jl1dgment 1'1ay not: be entered
where there is a genuine issue as to any ~aterial fact,
there is no fact-finding funct.Lon in connection with
the entry of su~h a judgment. It follo~s that no
findings of fact are needed to support a summary
judgment, and Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly so provides. Dred'e Corp. v.
Penney, 338 F.2d 456, 463 (9th Cir. 964).
In fact, in General Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers U. v.
Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687, (7th Cir. 1965), the court felt
that the making of findings of fact was ill-advised and
implied the existence of factual questions.

In light of

Blue Cab it is interesting to note that the Respondents' 37
findings comprise 12 full pages, although there was supposedly
no issue of fact.
Fourth, Appellants considered the second set of
findings of no effect because they were filed after the
notice of appeal from the original order.

Even the lower

court stated, on Respondents' urgings, that after the notice
of appeal was filed it was divested of jurisdiction.
Fifth, Appellants felt the second findings, so
discordant with the court's earlier findings, and the
irregularity thereof, would best be dealt with in the
separately perfected appeal, Case No. 15274.
Sixth, the second set of findings were signed
under extremely prejudicial and suspect circurnstai1ces.
Respondents mailed the proposed findings to Appellants and
to the court on Thursday, April 7, 1977.

(R. 385, 391)
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Appellants received the findings on Monday, April 11, and
immediately telephoned the court, only to discover they had
already been signed.I/

The lower court refused to hear

Appellants' objections to the findings, concluding, on
Respondents' urgings, that the filing of a notice of appeal
from the earlier order had divested it of jurisdiction to
review the second order.

(Transcript May 25, 1977 at 3: 17-

22; Minute Entry attached to Clerk's Certificate filed
June 16, 1977)
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants did not feel
that these findings and conclusions were entitled to considerao

tion in this appeal.

As Respondents have raised them in

their brief, and as this Court has, sua sponte, consolidated
the appeals, Appellants will speak to those findings and
conclusions in this brief.
B.

The Summary Judgment as Rendered Below Was Improper.
The summary judgment in favor of Respondents was

improperly rendered below in that the lower court not only
found facts, but based its decision on an express finding
that the prevailing parties' version of the facts was true.
This case below was heard on cross-motions for
summary judgment.

In such circumstances, each party claims

his entitlement to judgment, based on his opponent's version
of the facts; neither, however, concedes his opponent's
facts for purposes of his opponent's motion.
Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side
that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the

-11-
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making of such inherently contradictory claims does not
constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the
other is necessarily justified or that the losing party
waives judicial consideration and de~_- »::mination of
whetheL· genuine issues of material fact exist-.
If any
such issue exists it must be disposeu of by n plenary
trial and not on summary judgment.
R2~ns v. Cascade
Industries, Inc., 402 f. 2d 241, 245 {~:--d Cir :--TiJb[}
It is clear that motions for summary judgment do
not resolve or admit disputed issues of fact for judgment,
nor necessarily eliminate the necessity of trial, despite
the number of parties seeking summary judgment, and despite
allegations for purposes of each motion that there are no
disputed issues of fact.
Cross-motion confusion often arises in cases
similar to the instant one where an interpretation of documentary language is critical.

While both parties may concede

what the document says, there may remain a dispute pertaining
to what it means. If the disputed inferences are material,
evidence of intent and understanding must be taken precedent
to making findings of fact and resolving the case.
This Court has recognized that regardless of the
number of parties seeking summary judgment, disputes as to
material inferences may still exist.

For example,

in

West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 387 P.2d 686 (1963), a man
brought suit against his wife and son for dissolution of a
partnership and for an accounting.

The parties placed

several documents before the court, each contending ·for an
interpretation thereof inapposite to the other.

The plaintiff-

husband unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, the lower

-12-
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court specifically finding that he intended and understood
that certain monies advanced to the partnership were contributions to capital.

On appeal this Court perceived that

though the physical facts were not disputed, the inferences
drawn by the lower court were clearly contested:
[I]f the matter were to be determined solely upon the
basis of the documents, we would be inclined to the
view contended for by the plaintiff as to monies
advanced after the initial investment.
But it should
be abundantly plain that the documents are ambiguous
and uncertain.
It is therefore necessary to take
evidence and make findings of fact as to what the
intent of the parties was in executing them.
In that
connection it is proper to consider the background and
circumstances, including the relationship of the
parties, the purposes for which the various documents
were made and principles of equity and justice relating
thereto. West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 91, 387 P.2d 686
(1963).
Defendants then contended that plaintiff was precluded from
appealing those findings because he had conceded for purposes
of his motion that there was no dispute as to material
facts.

This Court flatly rejected that proposition, stating:

When a party thinks that his case is so clear that
he should have a summary judgment without trial and so
moves, the denial of that motion settles that issue and
nothing else.
That is, that he is not entitled to the
summary judgment. Depending on what else he asserts
and what is plead in opposition thereto, there may well
be issues of fact in dispute which it is necessary to
resolve in order to settle the controversy.
In such
event a trial of such disputed facts is necessary,
re ardless of who or how man
arties have moved
for a rulin in their avor as a matter o
aw.
Id.
(emphasis ad e
The West case makes it clear that even inferential
fact issues may not be resolved by sunnuary judgment.

In the

instant case, for example, neither party contests what paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement sa~, only what it @eans,

-13-
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the Appellants stating it called for a future agreement in
any instance, the Respondents claiming otherwise.

The lower

court, however, found it did not constitute au agreement to
agree.
In summary, each party movictg for summary judgment
merely claims his entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law, neither party, however, conceding his opponent's facts
and inferences for purposes of his opponent's motion.

Further,

"findings" are clearly improper at summary judgment because
they are made without proper judicial c0nsideration of the
weight of testimony and credibility and demeanor of witnesses.
See Singleton v.
(1967).

Alexande~.

19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126

That Appellants failed to prevail on their motion

should settle "that issue and nothing else".

Nonetheless,

Respondents now infer that denial of Appellants' motion
automatically entitles them to a suIDJnary judgment; i.e., that
Appellants have stipulated to have inferences drawn against
them by the lower court:
. . . counsel for all parties stipulated that the
matter would be disposed of by motion for summary
judgment
(RB 13)
The lower court also seemed to feel that as both
parties moved for summary judgment, a ruling in favor of one
party or the other, disposing of the case, was mandated.
Are you prepared to s·1.1bmit it on the motions or are
there any issues of fact that should be determined,
that is what I'd like to know, just without a lot of
horsing around on your Motions for SUP~~ary Judgment?
(T. at 6:3-6, R: 399).

-14-
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Okay, I don't want you to dodge around because I am
going to tie you down right now.
What I am saying is
that are you prepared -- do you want to argue this on a
Motion for Summary Judgment or are you prepared to
stipulate that this case may be submitted to the Court
as a question of law based upon your statement of facts
as set forth in your Motion for Summary Judgment?
Id.
at 6:9-15.
The Court then called for a stipulation "that it
is a question of law based upon the facts as set forth in
your respective motions".

Id. at 6:26-28.

The confusion is apparent.

Simply stated, the

lower court's difficulty in conceptualizing the procedure
for simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment in a
case where there were still contested issues of fact resulted
in his taking each party's view of the facts as true for
that party's own motion.

Having so disposed of all fact

issues, he then vacated the trial date and approved the
facts as set forth in Resuondents' affidavit as being true
and correct for purposes of Respondents' motion.

(Order, R.

359; Affidavit of Robert Klein, R. 337; Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law,

R.

Appellants are confident

369.)

that this method of disposing of the trial calendar and
eliminating contested factual stances is not authorized by
the rules of this Court.

It should be noted that the affidavit submitted
and filed by Handa Sandberg on March 15, 1977, the morning
of the hearing, was stipulated to as "uncontroverted" fact
for purposes of both motions.

(T. at 7:12-15, R. 399;

-15-
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Affidavit at R. 355)

Ultimately, it appears that the lower

court misconstrued the parties' stipulation on Mrs. Sandberg's
affidavit and instead attached the "llncontrovertecl" label to
Klein's affidavit filed one month earlier.
Order, R. 359)

(R. 337-348;

This is the only plausible explanation the

Appellants can offer for the court's "findings".
C.

Specific Objections to Findinzs of Fact.
Appellants attempted to make objections to Respondents'

self-serving findings in the lower court but the court felt
an interposed notice of appeal divested it of jurisdiction.
This Court, nevertheless, may consider "the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence . .

. whether or not the party

0

raising the question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings . . . "

Rule 52(b) U.R.C.P.

Immaterial Findings
Several of the findings are immaterial to the
issues of the case.

The parties' acts before the exercise

of the option have no bearing on whether the option was
exercised according to its terms.

Specifically, the acti-

vities with the Dixie Rural Electric Association condenmation
(Findings No. 6

& 8)

and the annexation of the land to the

City of St. George (Finding No. 12) have no bearing on the
sufficiency of the exercise of the option.
Irrelevant

Findin~s

Several other facts fouud have no probative value,
such as the establishment of a survey corner (Finding No. 15),
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and the failure of the Probate Order to mention Klein's
interest. (Finding No. 7)
Findings Showing

Failur~T_o __ ~?<ercis_~

Other facts found have no bearing on a proper
exercise, and in fact tend to indicate Klein's desperate
attempts to save himself from loss of a good deal.

For

example, his insistence on performance after the option's
expiration and Mrs. Sandberg's refusal to perform (Finding
No. 17), the submission of a real estate contract nearly a
year after the option's expiration (Finding No. 21), the
tender of some payments (Findings No. 22 and 23), sending a
letter demanding conveyance (Finding No. 24), his alleged
readiness to perform after the option expired (Finding No. 27)
and

Appellant~'

refusal to allow a tardy exercise or recognize

the earlier act as an exercise (Findings No. 25 and 26),
while designed to show Klein's intent to exercise and good
faith, merely display his failure to exercise.

These acts,

done largely after Klein's retention of counsel, do nothing
to revive the option.

That these belated attempts to comply

with the option were of no effect was pointed out in Appellants'
Brief at 73-77 and 86-95.
Findings Resolving Disputed Issues Against Appellants
Of course, all of the findings are subject to the
same fatal objection; that they are in conformity with
Respondents' affidavit when Respondents prevailed on summary
judgment below.

Appellants had alleged and presented

evidence which contradicts several of the findings made.
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J

Patently, the facts were not viewed favorably to Appellants.
Finding No. 13 cites that Mrs. Sandberg met with and made
suggestions to Klein's surveyor, while Mn;. Sandberg has no
recollection of a11y such suggestions.
AnWS No. 12, R. 135-136)

(DWS al 17;

Finding No. 15 describes a meeting

with the county commission, while Mrs. Sandberg denies it
ever took place. (DWS at 12)

Again, Finding No. 16 deals

with other conversations with Klein or his surveyor which
Mrs. Sandberg has denied.

(AnWS No. 17, R. 137; DWS at 13)

Finding No. 33, that the conveyance of 40 acres
was an acknowledgment of exercise as to all the property is
contradictory to Mrs. Sandberg's statements that she believed
that 40 acres was the full extent of the exercise.

23:24-29; 24:17-20)

(DWS

She then understood the option to have

expired (Id. at 30:12-13), and denied any discussion pertaining to the remainder of the acreage.

(Id. at 30:16-23,

and 56:4)
Finding No. 36 that Mrs. Sandberg acknowledged
Klein's purchase to third parties in 1972 is totally unfounded
and again contradicts Mrs. Sandberg's testimony.

(Id. at

51-53)
Findings Contradictory to the Evidence

a~d

Self-Contradictory

Several findings are not only contradictory to the
evidence, but actually

self-contradictory~

Most blatant are

the findings of conformity of land descriptions.

For example,

while the land descriptions reproduced :Ln Findings 2 ancl 5
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are clearly different, they are treated as identical.
Further, the survey prepared by Klein's surveyor is found to
conform to the other two descriptions in Finding No. 20.
Finally, to allay any doubt, Findings No. 21 and 28 find all
descriptions conforming.

The record below, however, clearly

depicts the descriptions as contradictory.

(See also

Appellants' Brief, hereinafter AB, 53-63, especially 60-61)
Respondents now suggest a reformation of the descriptions,
for the first time on appeal.

Alternatively, they ask this

Court not to concern itself with the facts.

(RB at 15)

Findings No. 21, 22, 28 and 30 specifically state
that the real estate contract and cashier's check conform as
to consideration with the option terms.

Yet the findings

themselves recite that only $19,000 was paid under the
option (Finding No. 10), while the contract recites a $20,000
payment to be credited to Klein.

Appellants' Brief pointed

out this error at page 94.
Finding No. 21 specifically declares the exercise
of the option by the tender of a check, while the Option
Agreement clearly called for execution of a contract.

The

court's findings found the option exercised by the March 30,
1971, letter, and the June 3, 1971 check.
Findings No. 30 and 32 state that the documents
are clear, unambiguous, and in the case of the OptiQn Agreement,
not an agreement to agree.

While certainly clear standing

alone, the Earnest Money Agreement and Option Agreement
describe different parcels, and the latter document is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unintegrated.

Neither, however, conforms to the proferred

Real Estate Purchase Contract, and to accept Klein's interpretation of the phrase, "as the parties may agree" is
heinous.

Lastly, it is all too convenient that the unambig-

uous and clear Option Agreement was found to fail to specify
the party responsible for preparing the real estate contract
requisite for its exercise.

(Finding No. 34)

the law, bore the burden of exercise.

Klein, under

(AB at 64)

Also, Klein

had provided that the expense of such preparation could be
credited against the ultimate purchase price, pursuant to
paragraph Sh of the option.

Appellants cannot understand

how the lower court found that they, as optionors, had a
duty of exercising their own option, leaving Respondent
Klein, the optionee, utterly confused as to his obligations.
After all, Respondent Klein drafted the option to state that
he could exercise only by execution of a real estate contract.
His alleged confusion is both feigned and inexcusable.
Likewise, the finding that Mrs. Sandberg requested
a delay in the survey which caused a delay in contract
preparation is unfounded and illogical.

The reason for

delay is found in Findings No. 16, 29 and 34 and explained
in Finding No. 28.

But what precluded Respondents from

submitting a real estate contract with the same price
formula contained in the option?

The initial

do~m ~ayment

was set at $2,000 regardless of the amount of land selected
and agreed to.

While Respondents claim through Finding No.

28 that calculation of price was essential prior to execution
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of a contract, the first payment relating in any way to the
amount of land selected was not due until one year after the
purported exercise.

Thus, Klein could have submitted a con-

tract with the price formula, and in the first year completed
a survey to ascertain the amount of the first annual payment.
This he failed to do, with neither the selection of agreed
land, nor the tender of a contract occurring in a timely
manner.
The finding (actually a legal conclusion) of
waiver of timely preparation (Finding No. 34) is dealt with
infra in Point VI, B, at 42.
The finding that the Option Agreement was not an
agreement to agree was dealt with at p. 41 in Appellants'
Brief.

See also Point IV, at 29 infra for the reply to

Respondents' arguments.
The finding that Klein exercised as to all the
land subject to the Option Agreement (Finding No. 33), is
also contradictory to all the evidence.

See Appellants'

Brief at 61 and Table II in the Appendix.

Klein drafted

this finding to avoid the conclusion that he attempted
exercise as to only part of the land, which exercise, even
in his view, would have required the agreement of the
parties.

That such a finding was entered, however, does not

alter the descriptions in the record.

The lack of support

for Respondents' self-serving findings is evident. It is
little wonder that Klein desires that this Court overlook
them.

(RB at 15)
-21-
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Illegitimate Findings
Appellants further contend that several findings
extend far beyond the court's earlier Order and Respondents'
theory of the case propounded below.

While the court

earlier found the option had been timely and properly
exercised, Respondents' fervor to protect their record,
estop

Appellants from asserting defenses and shelter the

flimsy framework of "proper exercise" has caused that framework to be obfuscated by Respondents' protective boilerplate of waiver, estoppel, and part performance.
To make. findings after a summary judgment is
• suspect, to freely delegate the making of findings to counsel
is patently improper, and to allow such findings as these to
stand is a mockery.

D.

S¥ecific Assignments of Error to the Conclusions
Law.

o

Appellants' original brief pointed out the erroneous
application of the law on the legal issues decided by the
lower court in its order entered Harch 25, 1977.

Specifi-

cally, Appellants argued that:
1. The court failed to apply the high evidentiary standard ("clear and convincing") appropriate to
actions for specific performance.
(AB 24)
2. The court erroneously considered evidence
other than that signed by Mrs. Sandberg.
(AB 27)

3. The court erroneously concluded the Option
Agreement was not an agreement to agree.
(AB 41)

4. The court ignored the fact that the Option
Agreement was incomplete by lack of a contemplated
exhibit.
(AB 51)

-22-
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5. The court erroneously concluded that the
various land descriptions were sufficient, unambiguous,
and conforming.
(AB 53)
6. The court ignored proper law in finding an
exercise of the option.
(AB 64)
7. The court improperly decreed specific performance of a document which contained terms inconsistent
with the option. (AB 86)
As Appellants' initial brief did not deal with
the second order, Table I in the Appendix correlates Appellants initial legal arguments with the issues raised in the
second set of findings and conclusions.
POINT Ill
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS A DEFENSE
Respondent argues that the Statute of Frauds
cannot be asserted to preclude enforcement of the "writings"
in the record in that
[t]his is not a case in which Respondent is seeking to
enforce an oral agreement to convey land. The agreements in this case have all been written. (RB at 17)
Respondent assumes, however, that all of his profferred

writings~/ automatically satisfy the statute once they
appear on paper.

Nonetheless, as Appellants have contended:

The statute requires that the contract designate the
parties, identify the land to be conveyed, recite the
consideration therefor, and contain the signature of at
least the party to be charged.
(AB at 17)
See 72 Am.Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §295 (1973). Thus,
writings other than the Option Agreement and Earnest Money
Receipt cannot be properly asserted against Mrs. Sandberg.
Further, only these documents were pled by Respondents in
their counterclaim.

Due to their insufficient and discordant
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descriptions, nonexistent exhibits, and requirements of
future agreement, however, these documents are insufficient
to bind Mrs.

Sa~dberg.

Respondents also claim that Appellants have not
formally raised the issue of the Statute of Frauds below.~/
Below, there was no apparent need.

Because Respondents

pled only the Option Agreement and Earnest Money Receipt
against Appellants, and both of those documents hear the
signature of Mrs. Sandberg, Appellants could not properly
object to those documents on the basis of the statute. When
it became apparent at the hearing, however, that Respondents
desired to bind Mrs. Sandberg on the basis of unsigned
letters and parol conversations, it became proper for Appellants to assert the statute as an evidentiary objection to
all of the evidence, parol in nature, or signed only by
Klein, contradictory to the writings.

Thus, by the very

course of proof offered by Respondents, at variance with their
pleadings, Appellants' assertions of the statute to preclude
judicial consideration of those parol matters must, under
Rule 15 U.R.C.P. and for reasons of substantial justice, be
treated as if raised in the pleadines.
Thus, Respondents' objection to Appellants raising
the statute forgets that Respondents, not Appellants, first
strayed from the pleadings, seekin~ specific performance of
written documents on the basis of unsigned letters and
dangling conversations.

This tactical ploy not only surprised

Appellants but is contrary to the HelJ -settled prindp1C'
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that parties seeking specific performance must conform their
evidence to the pleadings.
§189 (1977).

81A C.J.S. Specific Performance

Similarly, Appellants being moved against for

summary judgment were entitled to know their opponents'
evidence.

Burningham v, Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974).

Lastly, Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. generally permits a judicial
excursion beyond the pleadings to avoid injustice or fundamental
error.

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Utah

2d 329, 353 P.2d 168 (1960).

Such injustice or error would

certainly result here if this Court were to disregard such
an essential rule_ of law.

See,

~.

Greenblatt v. Munro,

, 161 C.A.2d 596, 326 P.2d 929 (1958).
Respondents' third argument that the Statute of
Frauds does not apply is based upon a misapplication of the
doctrine of part performance.

Appellants do not agree that

Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d
480 (1956) states the applicable law in the instant case.
First, Randall does not deal with an intervivos parol agreement to convey (as this present case does, there being no
sufficient memorandum), but with a decedent's earlier parol
promise to devise.
different.

Part performance under each is vastly

As stated in Note, "The Doctrine of Part Performance

as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah", 9 Utah L.Rev.
91, 101, 102 (1964):
[The promise to devise] differs from the one
involved in a contract for the intervivos transfer of
land in two respects: First, the plaintiff cannot
perform the acts of going into possession and making
valuable improvements because no possessory rights
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accrue to the plaintiff until the defendant's death;
and sc~cond, thf' promise to de vise results in the formation of a unilateral contract.
Un1ike the intervivos sale situation where payment
of consideration bv the plaintiff i~ not_!':!:..8_arded as an
act of part i:;erformance, in persona-r--service situations
the only act performed by the: plaintiff is the very
consideration called for by the agreement.
Further, Randall was decided when the doctrine of
part performance was in flux in Utah and often mixed with
elements of estoppel.

Appellants submit that the doctrine

of part performance is more accurately stated in the more
recent case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc., v. Ballard, 534 P.2d
611 (Utah 1975).
According to Holmgren, the threshold question is
whether there is a contract and what its terms are.
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, definite, mutually understood, and estciblished by clear,
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence
of the same quality. Id. at 614 citing Christensen v.
Christensen, 9 Utah 2-cr--102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959).
The reason for this strict requirement of an
unequivocal showing that there was an actual agreement
complete in all its terms was explained in an early case.
To call anything a part performance, before the existen~e of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said
to be part performance is established, is an anticipation of proof by assumption, ancl gets rid of the;
statute by jumping over it, for the statute requires
proof, and prescribes the medium of proof. Adams v.
Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465, 466, (1915), citing
Roberts on Fraucs, 135.
See_ also 73 Am. Jur. :'d Statute of Fra\1ds §lf01 (1974).
In the instant case, the Real Estate Purchase
Contract, upon which Klein seeks specific performance, was
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drafted one year after the option expired, and contains a
land description which did not exist on paper when the
option was purportedly exercised.

TI1e contract differs

materially from the option in consideration, time requirements, and necessity of mutual futute agreement as to land
sold.

Unsigned by the party against whom enforcement is

sought, it does not provide the threshold proof of existence
and terms of a contract requisite under Holmgren to invoke
the part performance doctrine.
Assuming, arguendo, however, that the threshold
proof of a contract has been made, Holmgren further delineates those acts sufficient to constitute a part performance.
These are transfer of consideration in conjunction with
either the making of valuable improvements on the land, or
entry into possession with the consent of the vendor.

Addi-

tionally, these acts must be performed subsequent to the
existence of the contract, and be exclusively referable to
it.
In addition [to clear, unequivocal and definite proof
of the contract and its mutually understood terms]
there must be acts of part performance which in equity
are considered sufficient to take the case out of the
statute of frauds:
(1) Any improvements must be substantial, valuable, or beneficial.
(2) A valuable
consideration is demanded by equity.
(3) If there is
possession, such possession must be actual, open,
definite, not concurrent with the vendor, but it must
be with the consent of the vendor.
(4) Such acts as
are relied on must be exclusively referable to the
contract [footnotes omitted]. Holmgren Brothers, Inc.,
v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614. ·(Utah 1975).
While Respondent claims the facts in this case
"clearly establish part performance hy Mrs. Sandberg and
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Respondent", and that "fpjart1al perfcnnonce by hoth parties
bars a staLuLe )f trauds

~efense

11
•

(lrn at 19), tl1c

acts to be consicl'"1:ed in evc.Juatinl'. a clc;im of part performance ..ir-c ac•:s performed by thtc

&r~0-~·

early Massachusetts Supreme Cour1

As stated by an

decision responding to

alleg.:i.Lions that <• gr au tor s cc,nvc. y:i.nce oJ part_)g/ of the

land invoked the doctrine of part performance as to the
remainder:
Indeed, the ruLe seems to be that no part performance, by the party sought to be charged, will take
an a~~eement out of the statute uf frauds, except in
those cases where the statute itself provides for such
effect. It is part performance by the party seeking to
enfo;ce, and not by the other party, to which courts of
equity look, in giving relief from the statute.
Glass v. HurJbe ·c, 102 Nass. 24, 31 (1869) (citations
omitted).
Klein does claim some cf his actions unequivocally
evince hie part performance:

On June 7, 1971, Respondenr tendered a down payment to
Mrs. Sandberg which was accepted and cashed .
Respondent made substantial payments over the years
which we~e a~cepted; Respondent expended time, energy,
and money in having a survey monument establjshecl and
in having the property annexed to the City of St.
George; Respondent had the property surveyed; and
Respon<!ent had the Real Estate Sales Contract prepared.
(RB at 19)
Acts of payment alone are never sufficient to
constitute part pc;·forrnance

[n qdaition,

th~

admittedly made simply to extend the option.

pay.rents were
The act of

annexation was do,1e afte< the lei.cer Resp011dcmt claims
exercisc'd
to

Uk

exer~:is_.§_,

optton,

t;ut,

ily

tlh letLer'1,

i.e .. prior to any cont,·act.

O'·Tn

terms, prior

The surveyi11g

done after the expiration of the option, but surveying,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28-

W<;s

similar to annexation, is not a substantial improvement on
the land.

Furthermore, were surveying or annexation a

sufficient act of part performance <'xclusively referable to
a parol contract, it would allow a unilateral act to define
the scope of that contract.

Similarly, if Klein's prepara-

tion of a contract of purchase can constitute sufficient
part performance of a parol agreement, Klein as the draftsman
could easily and unilaterally select its parameters.
The Statute of Frauds is a viable defense in this
case and should bar all evidence of an agreement, other than
that in writing and signed by Mrs. Sandberg.

Respondents'

unsigned letters, tender of monies and unilaterally drafted
purchase contract, while perhaps material and admissible
to show the attempted exercise of the option, cannot be
legitimately used to clarify or establish the terms of the
option or the agreement of the parties, and avoid the
Statute of Frauds through the part performance doctrine.
POINT IV
THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS AN
UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT TO AGREE
Appellants and Respondents disagree as to whether
the Option Agreement is unenforceable as an agreement to
agree.

The dispute arises under two different types of

clauses, one apparently requiring future agreement as to
selection of land in any event, the other providing for
future agreement on material terms as alternatives to fixed
terms.

(AB 41-51)

-29-
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Appellants maintain that the Option Agreement
r8quired a future agreement of the parties as to the land
subject to eventual purchase.

This contention is based on

Appellants' interpretation of Paragraph 5 of the Option
Agreement drafted by Respondent hlein.
5.
The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars
($200. 00) per acre at any tL1!e during the option
period, (including any extension period) ~executing
a contract to purchase all or such part or parts of
the &roperty as the ~arties rnay agree; such contract to
pure ase shall provi e as follows . . . (R. 61) (emphasis
added)
Appellants interpret the paragraph as requiring the agreement of the parties as to land purch1sed in all events.
(See Point V, AB at 41-45)

Conversely, Respondents assert

that this provision requires an agreement of the parties
only if there is an attempted exercise as to part of the
land subject to the option.

(RB 22)

Appellants feel that

careful analysis of the paragraph belies Respondents' claims,
but even if Respondents' interpretation is accepted, the
facts show an attempted exercise as to only part of the
property described in the Option Agreement.

(AB at 61)

Thus,

even under Respondents' strained interpretation, the requirement of future agreement is factually invoked.
Wanda Sandberg disputes Respondents' claims that
the $19,000 in payments made to extend the option make her
construction of paragraph 5 unreasonable.

Under amicable

circumstances, parties often provide for future agreement,
as is evinced by the plethora of decisions focusing on this
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point.

Many such contracts doubtless avoid judicial considera-

tion because the contemplated agreement is reached.

Ignorant

of the legal consequences of such a clause, the parties here
made and received payments; Mrs. Sandberg holding the land
from the open market and anticipating the making of such
future agreement as a condition precedent to Klein's exercise.

This is reasonable.

And, as Klein admittedly

drafted the option, perhaps "Appellants' construction" is
not the issue.

In such cases this Court should be con-

cerned with Appellants' "understanding" of the paragraph.
Jensen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970).
0

Clearly, this was her understanding.
398)

(DWS at pp. 13, 30; R.

The fact that Klein paid $19,000 changes neither the

substance of the option or the equities.

Thinking Respond-

ents had exercised the option by selecting a 40-acre parcel,
Appellants deeded them the same,. concededly worth $28,000,
in 1971.

(DRK 11:20-24, DWS at 26)
The parties clearly recognized the necessity of

such an agreement as the expiration of the option approached.
(See AB 47-49)

Also, Respondents conceded as late as eleven

months after the option expired, not only the necessity of
such future agreement, but that such agreement had not yet
been reached.

In May, 1972, Respondents' attorney wrote:

The parties have also tentatively agreed as to the
property description which, in our opinion, is"the only
matter yet to be fully resolved. (R. 115)
Appellants also maintain that the presence of
other clauses in the Option Agreement which allow alternaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tive performances of material terms render the option void
under the authority of Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385
(Cal.Dist.Ct.App

1947).

Responuents sufTll'larize Appellants'

argument and Respondents' objection quite well.
. . . Appellants cite Kline .
. for the proposition
that providing for a future agreement only as an alternative renders a contract void.
The holding of that
case does not even approximate such a proposision.
(RB
at 21)
Respondents' following analysis of the case, however, sacrifices
accuracy for brevity.

"

The court in Kline v. Rogerson stated the following as
the sole issue for determination:
'Was plaintiff the
owner or holder of the check executed by defendant?'
Contrarx to Appellants' representation that the general
phrase 'or terms to mutual satisfaction" following very
specific terms rendered the contract void, the specific
terms of the contract were unenforceable simply because
defend::mt had not signed the contract which meant he
had not at:i:eed to the specific terms.
(RB at 21)
Respondents apparently refer to the fact that in Kline the
parties had previously executed a deposit receipt (reproduced
in the margin of the case) but failed to execute a contract
of sale.

However, as is apparent from a close reading, the

deposit receipt was essentially an agreement of sale.

On

the basis of that receipt, Kline claimed the deposit as a
forfeiture. The court found that the deposit receipt was not
effective as an agreement for sale solely by reason of the
alternative phrase "or terms to mutual satisfaction":
The deposit receipt sianed by defendant did not
constitute an agreement of pui:chase and sale by the
parties since it expressly provided that the bala~
of the urchase rice was to be aio"'at $~0-0r
more per year, p us interest at Yo o£Terms to-IilUfual
satisfaction''.
Since the parties never agreed upon
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terms which were mutually satisfactory, there was never
an agreement of purchase and sale. Hence the plaintiff
was not entitled to any portion of the purchase price.
181 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added).
That this was the decision of the case, that is, that future
agreement as an alternative to specified terms renders a
contract unenforceable as an agreement to agree, is brought
out in the following cases, all of which cite Kline as
Appellants have done.

Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900, 903

(Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1958), Burgess v. Rodom, 121 Cal.App.2d 71,
262 P.2d 335, 336 (1953), Alaimo v. Tsunoda, 215 Cal.App.2d
94, 29 Cal.Rptr 806, 808 (1953).

See also Annot., 68 ALR 2d

1221, 1229 (1959).
Appellants maintain that under the authority of
Kline, clauses providing for future agreement even as an
alternative render a contract uncertain and unenforceable.
Paragraphs Sb and e of the Option Agreement fall expressly
within this category.
POINT V
THE LAND DESCRIPTIONS ARE FATALLY DEFICIENT
Respondents allege that the Court should overlook
the fact that the land descriptions in the various documents
are contradictory.

Furthermore, although the exhibits

allegedly appended to the letter of exercise neither are in the
record nor were they presented by Respondents below and are
thus concededly a matter of conjecture, Respondents ask this
Court to accept their description proferred one year after
the option expired. (RB 37; R. 117; R. 166, 170)

Appellants
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submit that it would be unjust to enforce this unilateral
declaration of self interest; rather, only clearly proven
contracts and agreements should be specifically enforced.
Pitcher v.

Lauritze~,

18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).

Respondents also allege that the land description
is a non-issue due to Wanda Sandberg's use of Respondents'
metes and bounds description in her complaint to quiet
title.

Appellants used that description in the cor.1plaint

because that description is what Respondents used in their
contract which was the cloud on title sought to be removed.
Respondents also prepared "findings" that Mrs.
Sandberg waived her objection to the land description defects.
The fallacy in this argument is that a waiver of defects
does nothing to cure the deficiency, and render a description certain.

Respondents apparently contend, however, that

a "waiver" enables them to select whatever land they desire
and claim it for the description.

Nonetheless, no two

descriptions before this Court conform, though several on
. own are unamb"iguous.11/
th eir

See AB at 59-61, and Table II,

Comparison of Land Descriptions, in the Appendix.
Respondents now advance plausible explanations for
the contradictions between the documents, but in doing so
commit several fatal errors.
First, they locate a reservoir on the maps when
there is absolutely no evidence in the record depicting the
same, other than the Earnest Money Rece:i pc. which says it is
somewhere in the NE l/Lf NE 1/4 of Section 22.

-34-

Second, they

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assume that the fence Klein pointed out to his surveyor and
allegedly plotted in the Real Estate Purchase Contract is
the fence indicated in the other agreements.

There is no

evidence that an unaided surveyor, using the Option Agreement or Earnest Money Receipt descriptions would find the
fence to be the one referred to in these documents.

Thus,

Klein's assertion is a self-indulgent one; there are several
fences on the property.

Third, Respondents rely on a con-

versation in 1971 that the fence platted by Klein's surveyor
in 1972 was earlier agreed upon.

Mrs. Sandberg recalls

walking a fenceline, and that the land selected would be
''located within the property physically identified by the
parties"; nothing else.

See AnWS No. 9, R. 134.

Thus, such

parol testimony now unilaterally supplies the description,
otherwise indeterminate.

This is impermissible under the

Statute of Frauds.
The land must be described in the agreement or by
reference to a plan or other matter so that it can be
identified and located, and the description must be
sufficiently definite within itself and not require the
aid of parol testimony or be left to the future action
of the same or other parties.
Safe Delosit & Trust Co.
v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co., 234 Pa.
00, 83 A. 54,

5 7 , LRA

191 7A 5 9 6 . ( l 912 ) .

Apart from Wanda Sandberg's denial of such an agreement, considerations of Klein's credibility, and the actuality of his
pointing out the same fence to a surveyor, the fact remains
that this testimony is parol.
\\Thile Respondents cite Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah

92, 164 P.2d 893 (1946) for the proposition that extrinsic
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j

and documentary evidence of description may be properly considered, they fail to specify the logical limitations of
such a rule.

Clearly, such evidence must he used ?n):Y__l_<?_?_id __A~~

clarify a ]and description, not to explain differences between
two different descriptions or to supply a new description.
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to
supply, a description of lands in a contract. Parol
evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective
description, or to show the intention with which it was
made.
Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of
identifying the description contained in the writing
with its location upon the ground, but not for the
purpose of ascertaining and locating ~~e land about
which the parties negotiated, and supplying a description thereof which they have omitted from the writing.
There is a c_lear distinction between the ad1:1ission of
oral and extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identifying the land described and applying the description
to the property and that of supplying and adding to a
description insufficient and void on its face.
Davison
v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 342, 517 P.2d 1026, (1973),
Appell;mts submit that what Klein actually seeks
is a parol reformation of the Option Agreement.

He admits

the descriptions vary in the Earnest Money Receipt and the
Option Agreement.

(RB at 33)

He further admits that the

option's description does not conform with his proferred
Real Estate Purchase Contract.

Klein's suggestion, therefore,

that this Court ignore this variance as a scrivener's error
seeks, through parol, not to clarify, but to change the
description in his Option Agreement, and somehow make it
conform to the Earnest Money Receipt and proferred contract.
Klein presents his view of the reservoir and fence locations,
and his recollection of an alleged oral ar,reement to support
this reformation of the plain and clear language of the
Option Agreement.

His desperate resort to parol attempts to
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avoid the obvious conclusion that his exercise was only as
to part of the land described in the Option Agreement.
Ultimately, Klein's attempted reformation, not
clarification, of the Option Agreement by resort to unilaterally proferred and self-serving parol makes the whole
contract parol and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
[W]here a written agreement is varied by oral testimony, the whole contract in legal contemplation becomes
parol. If there is anything settled in our law that
principle is finnly established. When, therefore, a
party to an executory agreement in writing for the sale
of lands succeeds in refonning it by oral testimony, he
reduces the whole agreement to a parol contract, and
derives himself of the right to have it specifically
perfonned. He pulls down the house on his own head.
When he coverts the writing into an oral agreement, the
statute declares it to 'be void'. He has rectified the
written contract, and in its place has established an
agreement which in contemplation of law is parol, and
therefore, by statutory mandate, absolutely invalid and
without force. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Diamond
Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 A. 54, 58, L.R.A.

l9l7A 596 (1912).

This result is generally reached by the courts.

To do

otherwise would be to bootstrap an avoidance of the Statute
of Frauds by first reforming a contract with parol, and then
enforcing it as reformed.

This is exactly what Klein desires

to do here; have this Court modify an otherwise sufficient
description, and then enforce it as modified.
POINT VI
THE OPTION WAS NEVER PROPERLY EXERCISED
The law with respect to the exercise or acceptance
of an option is succinctly stated in 91 C.J.S. Vendor and
Purchaser §10 (1955) as follows:
The acceptance of an option, to be effectual, must
be unqualified, absolute, uncortclition11l, unequivocal,
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unambiguous, positive, without reservation, and according
to the terms or conditions of the option.
Substantial
comlf liance with the terms of the. option is ~ i1o_t_ _ _
iuf icient to constitute an acceptance; to be effectual,
the acceptance must be identical wjth the offer, or,
at least, there must be no substantial variation lietween
them. An acceptance of an option must such a compliance
with the conditions as to bind both parties, and if it
fails to do so it binds neither.
_!i..:_ (emphasis added)
This rule of unqualified and absolute acceptance
has been long adhered to by the Utah courts.

See_,~·

Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah 1974); and Lincoln
Land and Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489
P.2d 426 (1971).
The lower court, however, applied the standard of
substantial compliance applicable to real estate contracts,
upon Respondents' explicit recorrunendation.

See, Respondents'

Memorandum of Points and Authorities at R. 279, citing 81
C.J.S. Specific Performance §102 (1953) and Fischer v. Johnson,
525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974).

That real estate contracts are

used as mortgage substitutes and have no critical event such
as exercise makes the real estate contract standard inapplicable.

For a comparison of the option and contract standards,

see 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance,

§§56 and 114 (1977),

appearing as §§47 and 102 in the 1953 edition.
Further, Respondents' reference below to Fischer
for the principle that substantial compliance is sufficient
to exercise an option is, at best, a curious one.

In that

case, Johnson cited Lincoln Land -'rnd Developrnent Co. v._
Thompson, supra, an option case, as a s~:andard for specific

-38-
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performance.
at 13-14.)

(Appellant's Brief, Fischer v. Johnson, No. 13530
Fischer's counsel, Mr. Cowley, responded:

Johnsons' reliance on the case of Lincoln Land and
Develo~ment Co. v. Thomp~on, 26 UtaFlZ"d 324, 489 P.2d
426 (1 71), is grounded in this mischaracterization of
our Earnest Money Agreement for Lincoln involved a
question of timely and adequate erercise (sic) of an
option.
The distinction between an option contract and a
contract of sale is fundamental. An 'option' is a
unilateral agreement, a continuing offer to sell,
binding only upon the optionor-owner to sell within the
time stated and upon the conditions set forth. The
option does not become a contract inter hares, in the
sense of an agreement to convey and pure ase, until
exercised by the optionee. A 'contract of sale' is a
mutually binding bilateral agreement which creates an
obligation to convey by one party and an obligation to
purchase on the other.
(Respondent's Brief, Fischer v.
Johnson, No. '13530 at 35)
Respondents' counsel obviously comprehends the
distinction between executory contracts to purchase real
estate and option agreements.

Nonetheless, he successfully

asserted the Fischer standard of substantial compliance
before the lower court.

Similarly, cases such as Lamont

v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973), and Leone
v. Zuniga, 84 Utah Lfl 7, 34 P. 2d 699 (1934), are inapposite
to option law.
A.

The Consideration Tendered was Insufficient.
As previously set forth, option agreements call

for strict compliance in their exercise.

Respondents have

conceded that their tender was $1,000 less than that called
for by the Option Agreement.11./ (RB 47)

As it is both the

duty and prerogative of the Supreme Court in this equitable
action to review both the facts and the law, substituting

-39-
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its judgment for that of the lower court, Appellants request
a reversal of the judgment entered below.
Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 19711)

Mitchell v.

AlternRtiveJy, Appellants

request that this Court remand this case to the lower court
for a specific finding on the consideration issue as well as
other matters.
Respondents' contention that their insufficient
tender was but a "de minimis" "mathematical error" obviously
does not comport with the strict compliance standard.
47)

(RB

Their excuse that insufficient tender was on1y ''dis-

covered late during the course of litigation" is immaterial,
a

as Appellants cannot be penalized for "late discovery", only
non-discovery.
th~t

(Id.)

Respondents' new allegations, however,

the assignments of error pertaining to consideration

are not properly before this Court are without foundation
and have seemingly been raised to somehow both shift Respondents' burden of proof and preclude this Court's careful
scrutiny of the records and submissions before it.
Though Respondents clearly bore the burden of
going forward, Appellants' discovery methodically set forth
the insufficiency of consideration, 13 1 thus confirming one
of Appellants' Complaint's initial assertions, that is,
[t)hat the option agreement between the parties be
declared to have expired for failure of the Defendant
[Respondent] to perfo~m and failu!e of consideration.
(R. 3) (emphasis added)
Furthermore, a cursory examination of Respondents' affidavit
in support of

sull1.~ary

judgment reveals the following assertions:

-40-
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(1) that only $19,000 was tendered on the option as prior
payments (tl2, R. 399); and (2) that the monies tendered in
the Real Estate Purchase Contract attached as Exhibit "O"
thereto reduced by a mysterious $20,000 in prior payments
conformed to the Option Agreement.

(Id.)

Finally, Appellants' memorandum for summary judgment asserted the following:
There is no proof either in Mr. Klein's deposition or
in his responses to Interrogatories and Requests for
Admissions upon which the Court could find Mr. Klein's
subsequent tender of monies and deeds to be an unequivocal and unconditional exercise of the option upon its
terms and conditions as drafted by Mr. Klein's attorney.
(R. 222-223)
Respondents' counsel had certainly discovered his
I
•
ff.icient
.
l 4 / To avoi. d tne
. o b vious
.
.
s insu
ten d er.~
c 1 ient
implications of this shortcoming, however, Respondents
successfully recommended the "substantial performance"
standard and further argued t.hat Appellants were seeking a
forfeiture, a doctrine totally inapplicable to option law.
(R. 284-288; see also Point VIII, infra, at 48)
The lower court's findings

specifically set forth

the conformity of tender requisite for specific performance.
(Order t4, R. 358)

For Respondents now to suggest that this

Court, sitting in an equitable appeal, is precluded from
reviewing those findings is oblivious to the record and the
nature of these proceedings.
This Court has previously held that issues of fact
preclude summary judgments where "uncontroverted" affidavits
nonetheless stood in opposition to the

~_v.erments

of Plaintiff's
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unverified complaint.

Christensen v. Financial Service Co.,

14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, 2 A.L.R. 3d 1144 (1963).
Similarly

this Court has held that the movant's affidavit

itself may be self-contradictory or consist primarily of
unsubstantiated opinions, precluding summary judgment.
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). In the instant case, Respondent's
affidavit (1) stands in opposition to Plaintiffs' complaint,
and (2) is itself self-contradictory on the issue of consideration.
Appellants in the instant case have methodically
set forth the insufficiency of Klein's tender among the
various documents in the record. 15 / Moreover, the pleadings
and even the self-serving, conclusory yet contradictory
nature of Klein's supportive affidavit focus specifically on
Respondents' inadequate tender.
B.

There Was No Waiver of Compliance.
The Option Agreement, in clear language, required

for its exercise the execution of a real estate purchase
contract by Buyer (Respondents). 16 1
The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase this
property . . . by executing a contract to purchase
. . . (~5, R. 61)
Respondents acknowledge that no contract was presented until
1972, almost a year after the option expired.

Respondents'

position is that
. Mrs. Sandberg requested that the survey, which
was necessary for the preparation of the purchase
contract in question, be delayed as an accomodation to
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her. The delay requested by Mrs. Sandberg cannot now
be used to Appellants' advantage.
(RB 38)
The lower court's original order in this case,
however, mentioned no such delay, waiver, or estoppel, but
simply founcl that the option was ci.mely exercised.
~~

(Order,

3, 7; R. 358) Recognizing the fallacy of the lower court's

findings as to the manner of exercise, Respondents simply
supplemented the court's findings with theories of waiver
and estopp•?.l.

These "facts" and legal conclusions are

surmnarizec L-.i. the second Conclusion of Law.
Sh,ce Wanda Sandberg did not object to any of the
conduct by Robert D. Klein prior to the exercise of the
option on June 7, 1971, and since Wanda Sandberg
requested the delay in completing the survey (which
d2l2yed the completion of the contract), and since
Wanda Sandberg has never objected to the legal description prepared by Howard Stevens and used by Robert D.
Klein in the Real Estate Purchase Contract, and since
plaintiffs have never objected to any of the terms and
condition3 set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared, executed and submitted by Robert D.
Klein to Wanda Sandberg in May of 1972 the plaintiffs
waived any objections or objections with reference to
those matters and have, since the tender by Klein in
June of 1972, been estopped from making any objection
with reference to said matters.
Aside from the arguments that (1) the judge had no
such conclusions in his findings and conclusions, (2) the
facts do not show a waiver (especially when the facts are
considered in favor of Appellants, considering Mrs. Sandberg's
affidavit that she never made such a waiver), and (3) the
equities are not sufficient to support a waiver or estoppel,
the resort to waiver as a. panacea remains fallacious.
First, a waiver by one vendor (or optionor) does
not constitute a waiver by the other vendors (or optionors).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-43-

Mansfield v.

Re~ding,

269 Pa. 357, 112 A. 437, 438 (1921).

Therefore, the acts oi Mrs. Sandberg can h!ive no effect on
the rights of
incer~sts

t~e

other appellants,

~he

children

~ith

in the property.
Second, as an extension of the time to exercise

the option varies itf terms, .it must be in writing under. the
Statute of Frauds and the equal di_gnities rule, and further,
be supported by consideration.

See Gulf Oil Coro. v. Willcoxon,

211 Ga. 462, 86 S.E. 2d 507, 509 (1955).
Third, a waiver may only be made of a condition or
promise that is not a material part of tt<e bargain.
~

This is

expressed in the Restatement of Contracts §297 as follows:
A promiser whose duty is dependent upon performance by the other party of a condition or return
promise that is not a material part of the agreed
exchange can make that -duty independent of such performance, in advance of the time fixed for it, by a.
manifestation of willingness that the duty shall be
thus independent. (emphasis added)
Here the condition "waived" was the essence of the contract ··
the form of acceptance and
C.

timeliness~

There Was No Obstruction of Performance.
Klein also alleges he should be excused from

strict compliance with the Option Agreement because Nrs.
Sandberg prevented his performance.

Appellants have no

argument ¥.'ith Respondents' st&tewent of the doctrine but
deny that it

ap~lie.s

here where allegedly Mrs. Sandberg

merely dee:line<l to pay half of the costs of a survey of "the
property" in 1971.

Klein could have submitted a real estate

contract with the sJme price formula as the Option Agreernent.
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As previously pointed out, the acreage and total price did
not affect the initial payment, but only the first annual
payment.

Klein could also have completed the survey and

credited the cost against the purchase price under paragraph
Sh of the Option Agreement, or simply completed the survey
at his own expense.

He drafted the Option Agreement; it

imposed no such duty of contribution on Appellants; the
proposal that she pay half is an attempted parol modification.
Further, there is no evidence that Mrs. Sandberg denied
Klein's surveyor entry on the land at any time.
D.

The "Exercising Documents" Were a Rejection,
If Anything.
Besides assuming that the survey was essential to

drafting of the contract, Respondents' waiver and obstruction
arguments presuppose that Mrs. Sandberg had a duty to pay
one-half the expense of a survey.
the Option Agreement.

This was not required by

If the duty arose from Klein's

acceptance the acceptance was not unconditional.

As stated

by author.ity cited by Respondents at 55 Am.Jur. Vendor and
Purchaser §39, now appearing as 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and
Purchaser, §91 (l975):
If the optionee attaches conditions not warranted by
the terms of the option to his acceptance or notice of
his election to buy, this itself amounts to a rejection;
but it is otherw-ise when the acceptance is in the first
instance unconditional . . . (RB 42).
Alternatively, if Mrs. Sandberg's participation in
the survey was

££!.

called for by the option or the accept-

ance, how can her refusal to participate effectively waive
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Klein's timely performance?

Simply staten, the alleged

acceptance in 1971 was either conditional, requiring a<lditional perfornance on Appel 1 an ts' !'art and thus a :r c:i ec t: ioll,
or, if unconditional, then Mrs. Sandberg's refusal to participate in such

survey costs cannot te al1cged as a material

breach excusing, or waiving Klein;s timely performance.
POIN'l VII.

THERE IS NO MUTUALITY
The lower court held that Klein's unsigned letter
dated March 30, 1971, and a tender of $2,000 in June of the
same year exercised the option.
o

This contradicts the option's

clear requirement of submission of a formal contract for exer·cise.

Appellants further complained that there was no

mutuality within the option period.
If the letter and the check represent the acceptance of
the Option Agreement, giving rise to a contract between
the parties, then as of the date of Klein's 'acceptance'
both Klein and Mrs. Sandberg must have had enforceabl.e
obligations.
(AB 84)
Appellants pointed out the problems which Mrs. Sandberg
would have had in bringing a suit

agains~

Klein alleging the

unsigned letter and check as an acceptance, and cited
Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101, llOJ (1926)
for the proposition that "[a] contract to be bindinr, upon
one must be binding upon the other."

(AB 83)

Respondents misconstrue Appellants' arg1..auant
regarding lack of mutuality as implying a need for equivalence.
This is not the case.

Appellants have little doubt that an

appropriate contract tendered by Respondents would by
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necessity have contained those forfeiture provisions called
for in the Option Agreement.

Appellants merely point out

that the letter and check are so r.onconforming to the Option
Agreement, so equivocal, prec-atory, and ambivalent as to
belie the existence of a mutually binding contract.

As

stated in 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance §35 (1977):
Before a court may decree specific performance of an
alleged contract, there must be a valid, binding agreement: Thus it is required that the agreement be a
concluded or completed contract between the parties to
the suit. Thus, the court cannot make a contract
between the parties and then proceed to decree specific
performance of the contract it has itself made. It
cannot require the performance of any contract other
than the one which the parties themselves made.
Respondents have repeatedly admitted that the
letter merely expressed an intent to exercise the option and
almost one year after the purported exercise, stated that
the property description was "yet to be fully resolved".
(P.R. 57; R. 114-116)

Respondents now claim a binding contract

was formed by the unsigned letter, which reportedly contained
exhibits not presently a part of this record.

As Respondents

state, "[t]he proposed annexation plat is not a matter of
record and what it showed or did not show is a matter of
conjecture." (RB 37)
This casual admission that the descriptions
referred to in that letter are unknown and undemonstrated in
the record before this Court cannot be overlooked. Where
Respondents' obligations are reduced to but a matter of
conjecture, there can be no mutuality.

Furthermore, the

Statute of Frauds would have precluded the assertion of the
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letter as against Klein.

It cannot be said that Respondents

irrevocably bound themselves.

P. 2d 303 (Wyo. 1976).

In .Crockett, prospective purchasers

of real estate sued the executrix of a landowner's estate
for specific performance.

The Wyoming Supreme Court found

the contract to be an option, cited Utah authority for the
strict compliance standard of exercise, and found a letter
of intent not absolute enough and not in the proper form to
be an exercise.

The court said specifically that "[o]ne

cannot enforce a contract not binding upon himself." Id. at
• 310.
Likewise, where Klein's acts were !lot in strict
compliance and are both insufficient to bind him and uncertain
in the record, there can be no contract.
POINT VIII
RESPONDENTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE
EFFECT OF THE $19,000 PAYMENTS
Throughout their brief, Respondents have attempted
to infer that their $19,000 in payments made on the Option
Agreement have some talismanic effect on its substance or
somehow bring into consideraton the doctrine of forfeiture.
(See RB 19, 22, 24, 30)

It is clear that payments made to

maintain an option's existence do not change its terms.
And, while. Respcndents infer that equity will not allow
Appellants to accept such pci.ymenls and avoid their obligation,
this loses sight of the fact that the obligation paid for,
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that of maintaining the option in good stead through 1971,
was received.

(RB 24)

Simply stated, Appellants never

denied the existence of the option.
Respondents' reliance on Woolsey v. Brown, 539
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975) is misplaced.

In Woolsey, prior

acceptance of payments under an existing bilateral land
contract was held sufficient to effectuate a waiver of
timely payments, because strict application of that contract's
forfeiture provisions would result in a loss of the vendor's
equity and expectation of title under the contract.

Because

such contracts are increasingly used as mortgage substitutes,
Utah courts have readily buffered their stringent provisions
to allow purchasers thereunder rights similar to those of a
mortgagor when a mortgagee seeks to accelerate and declare a
default.

Id., see also Lamont v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508

P.2d 532 (1973).

The rule is a· salutory one.

Conversely,

however:
An option contract does not come within the equitable rule against forfeitures. The question of declaring
a forfeiture is not involved. An option contract gives
the optionee a right under the named conditions. If
those conditions are not met, the optionee does not
acquire the right. Such a situation involves none of
the elements of a forfeiture. In deprives no party of
any right and abrogates no contract, but, on the other
hand, is but the enforcement of the contract made by
the parties. Lake Shore Country Club v. Brand, 339 Ill.
504, 171 N.E. 494,
(1930).

soi

The Lake Shore court further pointed out that
judicial manipulation of an option agreement under the
pretext of preventing a forfeiture would necessarily violate
the very essence of an option:
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A co.urt of equity c::mnot relieve ·~he optionee from
ttl(o effect of: his failure to '~omply v:. ::L ~:c.2 con di tiun~
on which he has been granted tje priv-'..l2\e of ou:ring.
This '.•ould make a new contrac:: for t:i.2 ru:-::i.e:> and
comoel the owner to 3ell when he had not a~reed to do
so.- The optionee must perform all conditi:.,ns precedent
to his ::i.;;ht to ?Urc:1ase not '''°li.ved by tf:.-e C)ptionor. In
this res?ecc the ~eni3l of dn option co 9urc~ase pco?er~y
differs from the forfeiture of property ri6ht3 already
acquired under a bilateral contract. James on Option
Contracts (1916) §862. Therefore, unless the appellee
has met the conditions of the option contract or the
conditions have been waived, it ~s not eutitlad to
exercise the option. 171 N.E. at 501.
As stated in Sim Ltunber Co. v. Thompson Land

,r_,_

Goal Co_._, 76 S.E.2d 105 at 110, (W.Va. 195.}), an op·:ion is
;.10t

is no Lorfeirure.
~.i:

~1:::'.'e

an i.nterest, but a

Indeed,

:··ersonal right, anJ thus there
~ppellants'

conveyance of 40 acres

1971, then conceci2cl1y 'vorth $28,000, perceived by Hrs.

:.>2.nciberg

a.5

the exercise of >:he option, makes the present:

rlJim of forfeiture a mischaracterization of the nature of
t~e

option and is purblind to the facts and equities of thi3
.,. 7 I

c:is2.·--

.\ppellants firmly ·oelieve that several leg;il issues
aa to which 1·1,ere are

n~

:=elevan: factual issues a:=e decisive

in their favor, ar.d that this Court must enter judgment in

tl"l"'ii:- "Eavor.

Alternatively, t:1e presence of faclual issues

requires reruand of this
Respectfully

cas~

fo7 triol.

submi~tec

this 23th day of December,

1977.
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FINDING/CONCUJS
No.
SUbstance
FINDINGS OF FACT:
20 Real property optioned to Klein is .ct.
Estate Purchase Contract.
lil

~

AB 53-63
AB 87-91

21

Real Estate Purchase Contract consiier
funey Receipt and Option Agreerrent aaterial
consideration, and all other tenIJ.S.

AB 86-95

23

$68,359.04 was full payment for the

AB 94-95

28

Fence survey & Real Estate Purchase !XLPr•
are consistent with Earnest 'ltlney PITEnt, and observation by the pa.,.·
dispute' or armiguity in larv·

AB 62
\B 53-63
~ 27-32

30

Earnest funey Receip~
unambiguous. Kl.e.f

'\-63

·n

31

On June 7, l~
down payment.

32

Option Agreerrent
to agree.

33

Deed of 40 acres die
indicated total exerc.

34

Mrs. Sandberg waived t~
requesting delcry in surv

44 hei"ei-n

37

Klein expended time, energy

26 herein

38

Equity requires performance.

Footnote 16 herein

CDNCLUSIONS OF I.AW:
1 Earnest funey Receipt & Option Agreerlictory.
unarrbiguous and enforceable. Klein E
:erta:in.

2

Mrs. Sandberg did not object to condi
June 7, 1973; requested delay in sun
legal descriptions or terms of Real E
Contract and has waived all objection

3

Klein has fully perfonred and is enti
perforrmnce.

*

AB 53-63
AB 86-95
AB 64-77
20 herein
44 herein
43 herein

AB 64-77
AB 86-95
AB 41-51;61
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TABLE I
CDRREI.ATION OF APPELUINI'S I ARGUMENTS

wrrn

FINDING/CDNCLlJSION

OF FACT:

*

SUbstance

S stance
[NGS

SECDND FINDINGS AND CDNCLUSIONS

~

Real property optioned to Klein is as described in Real
Estate Purchase Contract.

Land subject to option not clear; descriptions contradict.
Real Estate Purchase Contract does not conform to Option
Agreement as to land description.

AB 53-63
AB 87-91

Real Estate Purchase Contract consistent with Earnest
M:mey Receipt and Option Agreement as to legal description
consideration, and all other terms.

Real Estate Purchase Contract does not conform with other
documents as to description, consideration, and other material
terms.

AB 86-95

$68,359.04 was full payment for the 431.84 acres.

The arr:ount is $1,000 short.

AB 94-95

Fence survey &Real Estate Purchase c.ontract descriptions
are consistent with Earnest M:mey Receipt, Option Agreeuent, and observation by the parties. No discrepancy,
dispute, or arri>iguity in land description.

There is no evidence the fence surveyed is the one referred
to in the docurnents.
Descriptions contradict.
Statute of Frauds bars parol evidence.

AB 62
AB 53-63
AB 27-32

Earnest M:mey Receipt & Option Agreenent are clear and
unambiguous. Klein tirrely perfonned all obligations.

Earnest M:mey Receipt & Option Agreement descriptions are
different.
Klein did not tirrely exercise.

AB 53-63
AB 73-77

On June 7, 1971, Klein exercised the option by making the

The "exercise" was inproper, equivocal, untirrely, and

down payment.

tentative.

AB 64-77

Option AgreeIIEilt not vague or ambiguous; not an agreement
to agree.

Option Agreement clearly required the agreenent of the parties
as to partial exercise,.which agreerrent has not occurred.

AB 41-51;61

Deed of 40 acres did not indicate 40-acre exercise, but
indicated total exercise.

Conveyance evidences exercise as to only 40 acres.

Footnote 10 herein

Mrs. Sandberg waived timely preparation of contract by
requesting d.elay in survey which d.eZayed contract.

Mrs. Sandberg could not waive on behalf of alZ plaintiffs;
waiver of essential teI'l11 not possible; d.eZay of survey did
not delay contract.

44 herein

f

Klein e:rpend.ed time, energy and money in reliance on exercise.

Acts are insufficient to show part performance.

25 herein

•

'Equity requires performance.

Equity does not favor Respond.ents.

Footnote 16 herein

& Option Agreement are valid,
unanhiguous and enforceable. Klein exercised the option.

Land descriptions are unenforceably arri>iguous & contradictory.
No real estate contract was submitted until 1972.
The "exercising letter" was precatory, ambivalent & uncertain.

AB 53-63
AB 86-95
AB 64-77

I

Mrs. Sandberg did not object to conduct of Klein prior to
Jwze 7, 1973; requested d.eZay in survey, never objected to
legal d.escriptions or terms of Real Estate Purchase
Contract and has waived all objections and is estopped.

No such waiver occurred.
Waiver of material terms impossible.
Children, as parties, waived nothing.

20 herein
44 herein
43 herein

a

Klein has fully perfonned and is entitled to specific
performance.

Klein has failed to perform in:
properly exercising.
tender of conforming contract,
obtaining agreem:mt as to exercise,

AB 64-77
AB 86-95
AB 41-51;61

llil.USIOOS OF IAW:

l Earnest M:mey Receipt

i:
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TABLE II
CXl1PARISON OF I.AND DE.SCRIPITONS

All land owned by the sellers in
Sections 21, 22 and 27, T™11Ship
42 South, Range 15 West, S.L.M.,
consisting, so far as the parties
can detennine at this ti.rre of
approximately 500 acres not including any water or water rights,
and less the following:
There is now a reservoir constructed
by the City of St. George on what

the parties believe to be the NE 1/4
NE 1/4 of Section 22, and there is
an old fence running north and south
west of this reservoir. 1he sellers
intend to reserve from said sale all
land in said Section 22 which lies
east of said fence line, it being
understood that the exact line will
have to be detennined i f and when
the option hereinafter IIEiltioned is
executed.

Armexation Plat

Option Agreemmt

Earnest MJney Receipt

[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in
Section 21, Section 22, and Section 27 of Township 42 South, Range
15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
consisting of approximately 500
acres, which property shall be IIDre
particularly described in Schedule A
attached hereto, to be signed by the
parties and made a part hereof for
all purposes; not including any water
or water rights, and excluding all
land in the Northeast one quarter of
the northeast one quarter of Section
22, which lies East of the old fence
line, which runs North and Southwest
of the City of St. George reservoir,
said excluded property also to be
IIDre particularly described in
Schedule A attached hereto and made
a part hereof for all purposes.

Real Estate Purchase c.ontract

All of the NE 1/4 Section 22, Less that
portion within Washington City.
All of the NW 1/4 Section 22 lying south
of Interstate Highway 15.
All of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 and E 1/2 SW 1/4
Section 22.
All of the E 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 21 lying
south of Interstate Highway 15.
NE l/ 4 SE l/ 4 Section 21.
All of Sectional lots 1 & 2 Section 27.
All being located in T. 42S., R.15W., Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
(R. 109 (emphasis added)) .

I

1he following described property located in Washington
County, State of Utah, Township 42 South, Range 15 West:
Section 22: SE 1/4 SW 1/4; NE 1/4 SW 1/4; NW 1/4 SW 1/4;
SE 1/4 NW 1/4; NE 1/4 NW 1/4; also
Beginning at an existing fence line at its intersection
with the North line of Section 22, T42S, Rl5W, SLBC.M,
which point is 12. 2 feet west from a stone m:n.md mrrking
the NE comer NW 1/4 NE 1/4 said Section 22 and running
thence S 0°14'W 1338.5 feet along said fence line, thence
S 89°36'30" E 433.0 feet along said fence, thence S 10°
09'30" W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence S 83°49'30"
W 107.0 feet along said fence, thence S 12°40'10" W
910. 49 feet, rrore or less, along said fence to the Souu"
line NE 1/4 said Section 22, thence west 1380 feet to the
SW comer said NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the N
1/4 corner said Section 22, thence east 1307.8 feet to
the point of beginning. c.ontaining 86. 84 acres, m::Jre or
less.
Section 21: SE 1/4 NE 1/4; NE 1/4 SE 1/4.
Section 27: All of sectional lot 1 consisting of approximately 19 acres; all of sectional lot 2 consisting of
approximately 42 acres.
All of said property consisting of approximately 431.34
acres. (R. 328).

City of
Washington

(Entirety of Section
22 annexed to City
of St. George, except
portion in City of
Washington.)

NE 1/4 NE 1/4

reserved
to Mrs.
Sandberg

NE 1/4 Sec. 22

Section 22
1.
2.
3.

Reservoir in NE 1/4 NE 1/4
Section 22.
Fence North and Southwest of
reservoir.
Exclusion of all land in
Section 22 east of fence.

Section 22

Section 22
1.

2.
3.
4.

Reservoir not specifically
located.
Fence north and southwest of
reservoir.
Exclusion of land east of fence
only in NE 1/4 NE 1/2 Secticn 22.
No Schedule A exists.

1.

No reservoir is mentioned.

2.

No fence is IIEltioned.

3.

No exclusion.
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Section 22
1.

No IIEltion of reservoir.

2.

A fence is located.

3.

Exclusion in both NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of NE 1/4,
Section 22.

FOOTNOTES

l/ This Order was on its face a final one and twentyone days had passed since its entry when Appellants filed
their notic~ under Rule 73 U.R;C.P.
~/ The lower court entered a formal Order to this
effect on June 6, 1977.

ll The procedural irregularity noted by Respondents on
page 4 of their brief was caused primarily by their tender of
a second Order to the lower court contrary to the dictates of
the Order docketed March 25, 1977. Regardless of the cause
of the irregularity, however, Respondents' proposition that
Appellants' appeal from the Order entered on April 19, 1977
should be dismissed has been previously heard by this Court
and denied.
~/ In appeals from equitable actions, it becomes both
the duty and the prerogative of the Supreme Court to review
both the law and the facts and to make its own findings and
substitute its jurlgment for that of the trial court. Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, every
inference and every position arguable on behalf of the
Appellant must be taken by this Court. Holbrook Co. v. Adams,
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).

21 Respondents' counsel dismissed this assertion as a
"professional insult from some rather inexperienced counsel."
(Transcript May 25, 1977 at 10:25-26)
~/ It should be noted that one affidavit was stipulated
to as "uncontroverted" for purposes of both motions. That
affidavit was the one submitted and filed by Wanda Sandberg
on March 15, 1977, the morning of the hearing below.
(T. at
7:12-15, R. 399; Affidavit at R. 355) Ultimately, it may be
that the lower court misconstrued the parties' stipulation
on Mrs. Sandberg's affidavit and instead attached the "uncontroverted" label to Klein's affidavit filed one month earlier.
(R. 337-348; Order R. 359) This is the only plausible
explanation the Appellants can offer for the court's "findings".

2/ Respondents' counsel represented to the lower court
that he mailed the proposed findings "about ten days" before
they were signed.
(Transcript of Testimony, May 25, 1977 at
8:24-25)
§_/ Appellants strenuously object to Respondents' reference to "acknowledged writings" in Respondents' Brief at 18.
None of these writings are acknowledged.
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21 Respondents rely on five cases in support of their
statement. Three of them (Wafn~r v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366,
482 P.2d 702 (1970), In Re Ek er's Esta;~. 19 Utah 2d 414,
412 P.2d 45 (1967), Rite:c v. Ca_yia~, l9 Utah 2d 358, 431
p. 2d 788 (J 967)) werec.?:sesl:nwhich the plaintiff attempted
on appeal to present a nc:w theory of recovery"-:---Tnese same
three cases and another case (Sta i:e By anu Throud1 Road
Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah NH295, 49.) P.ZCf"tlTTTI"972))
were appeals following a trial on the merits with full
development of issues. In the ot~~r c~se cited, (Thl9r3on
Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, .>08 P.2d 528~ 7 }),
the Court noted that the issue sought to he raised for the
first time on appeal was presented in another related case.
lO/ In this case, the conveyance of l+O acres to Respondents in 1971 may be alleged to be part performance. Obviously,
from the citation of Glass, acts of Mrs. Sandberg are not
part performance. In--ract, the Gl~~ court spe~ificalry-said that the conveyance of a portion of the land is neither
a part performance, nor is it a recognit~on of the alleged
oral contract so far as it relates to the remaining land not
included in the deed. On the contrary, it is in distinct
disregard and implied disavowal of such a contract. Glass,
~. at 29.
Obviously, alleged partial conveyances-always
oeg-t11e question; part of what? The whole, by conveyance
of part, can hardly be determined.
ll/ Respondents object to Appellants' reliance on the
annex.s.tion plat (included in the record as an Exhibit by
Respondents) when the March 30, 1971, letter refers to the
EI_Qposed annexation plat. (RB 37) Respondents apparently
Inter that the proposed annexation plat, referred to on
March 30, 1971, is a materially different document than the
annexation plat which bears a surveyor's certificate dated
April 5, 1971, only 5 days later. Appellants feel that
Respondents, who bore the burden of proof below, would have
included such an exhibit were it probative. Appellants have
never seen it.
12
.
' f ata 1 even i~
. .c Appe 11 ants were to
- / Th'is concession
is
concede the conformity of land descriptions.
' '
-l3/ i.n h'is initia 1 petition
be f ore t h e pro b ate court,
Respondent recited prior payments of $19, 000.
(Probate
r~cord at 55)
Su?sequently, but as part of the same petition, ~esponuent incongruously recited prior payments
totalling $20,000 (Id. at 61) From this point forward
Appellants sought dIScovery on the consideration rnatter,
contending ~h~t all the ma~ters presented in Respondent's
probate peti~ion were' essent:i.cilly in dispute.
(Id. 103)
Appellants file? a separate complaint seeking to quiet title
to the land claimed by Respondent and specifically alleged
T

o

•

•
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failure of consideration as a ground for voiding the Option
Agreement.
(R. 1) Thereafter in interrogatories to Avalon
Klein, Appellants attempted to ascertain whether any payment
was alleged to have made were made by parties other than
Respondent Robert Klein.
(R. 17-19) Royal K. Hunt, Esq.,
acting as counsel for Appellants, requested any and all
information by and through which the Defendant and Respondent Robert D. Klein based his conclusion regarding a tender
of full performance of the conditions for exercise of the
Option Agreeuent. (R. 25-27) Respondent's answers referred
to the earlier petition in the probate case referred to
supra, which was disputed.
(R. 28-31) Unsatisfied with the
response, Appellants then submitted a request for admissions
to Respondent Klein detailing payment by payment the $17,000
paid between June 14, 1962 and December 14, 1970, pursuant
to the terms of the Option Agreement. (R. 55-56) In his
answers to requests for admissions, Klein verified what
Appellants thought true, that insufficient funds had been
tendered.
(R. 66-67) During discovery, Respondent Klein
had marital difficulties and a second wife, Frances Klein,
was requested to admit or deny whether she made any additional payments on the Option Agreement. Her responses
indicate that she offered no additional consideration. (R.
128-131.) Ultimately Respondent Klein moved before the court
for permission to file a counterclaim. (R. 164-165)
The
counterclaim alleges that payments were made as required
under the option agreement and that Klein timely tendered
"the full purchase price" for the real property allegedly
contained in the Option Agreement. (R. 166-168, particularly
'a 4 & 6)
14 / For example, his memorandum before the lower court
clearly recites that only $19,000 had previously been paid
under the Option Agreement.
(R. 286, 288)
15 / See footnote 12, supra; Appellants' Brief at 94-95.
16 1 Respondents' contention that the option did not
specify who was to prepare the contract is inane. The law
places the burden of exercising - accepting the offer - on
the optionee. Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson,
26 Utah 2d 324, 487 P.2d 426 (1971). Obviously the Respondents were to prepare the contract. Were Appellants expected
to prepare the contract and have it waiting in case he
desired to exercise? The Option Agreement specifically
provided that Respondents could apply such costs to the
purchase price.
(Paragraph 5(h), R. 61)
17 1 Respondents assert that the description on the Real
Estate Purchase Contract they tendered was consistent with
the Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement "according to
the parties' understanding thereof". (RB 10) Respondents
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fail to state that Mrs. Sandberg has previously indicated
she never understood what Respondents intended, and it is
clear that she never.indicated to either the St. George City
Council or the Washington County Corrunission that Respondent
.K.'..cin had exercised the Op ti 01~ Agreement, as Klein has
dairned.
(AnWS No. 17, R. 137; Anlil+RK Nos. 3a & b, R. 152)
Further, Respondent Klein has previously claimed under
oath that "[h)e was buying approximately 450 acres ~
described in Holidaire Lands annexation plat." (No. 3c, Id.;
R. 152-153; Plat R. 109) On appeal, however, he contends
that that plat also depicts contiguous property that he is
not purchasing.
(RB 9; Plat. R. 109) It is little wonder
that Respondents, in alleging all these descriptions to be
identical, cont~~.ally refer this Court to the findings of
fact entered by the lower court instead of the actual
documents in the record on appeal. The findings conform in
large part to the conclusory affidavit filed by Respondent
Klein on February 14, 1977. (R. 337-345; 369-380)
Respondents' contentions that Appellants orally agreed
to the surveyor's description prepared in 1972 are both
inunaterial and without foundation. Davison v. Robbins, 30
Utah 2d 333, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). Mrs. Sandberg-rscinly
understanJing was that the land ultimately agreed to be
somewhere within the boundary demarked b_y the fenceline
and not coextensive with it.
(AnWS No. 9, R. l3Lj:J
Respondents also state that Mrs. Sandberg represented
to third parties after December of 1971 that Respondent
Klein had purchased "the property". (RB 11-12) The basis
for this "finding" is Mrs. Sandberg's deposition, R. 398, at
pages 51-52. A reading of these pages reveals that both Mr.
Klein's counsel and Mrs. Sandberg got confused at the
deposition and had to begin this series of questions over.
~- at 52:18-20)
Ultimately, Mrs. Sandberg could only
recall statements made before December 1971.
(Id. at 52)
Furtho:.rmo:i:,~. Respondent Klein's own affidavit confirms that
Mrs. Sar1dberg refused to discuss the option with him after
December of 1971. (U9, R~ 341-342) Klein's omniscience
apparently allows him co testify at will as to Mrs. Sandberg's
"understanding". · Mrs. Sandberg unfortunately is not equally
gifted and has indicated her failure to comprehend Klein's
intentions, affirmatively testifying that no agreement was
ever made in June of 1971.· (AnWS No. 17, R. 137; DWS, R.
298 at 30:12-19)
Lastly, Respondents quote Mrs. Sandberg as stating that
she and the Respondent "walked out on the fence and that at
that time she was insisting that the meandering fence was
the boundary of the property she was selling, and. that
Respondent agreed thereto." (RB 24, citing DHS, R. 398 at
14-15) There is no such quote.
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